1. the modal ontological argument is sound
2. goodness is rooted in the necessary divine nature (along the lines of simplicity, rather than DCT)

If these are correct, then the nature of moral goodness is also necessary.  But I want to say of the following that one is true and the other is false:

• if God didn't exist, morality would still exist
• if God didn'te exist, then morality wouldn't still exist

I need to think more about counterpossibles and the way to get one of these (the correct one) to come out true, and the other false.

Just over a week ago, while walking through Colonial Williamsburg with my friend Neal, I received a call from the clerk in Washington DC helping me get a visa that my application was denied by the Chinese government. (Allison's visa was approved with no problem.) 

The consulate of The People's Republic of China has rejected your request for a visa to enter the country...  You need to contact the State Administration for Religious Affairs of the People's Republic of China and get a letter of invitation or a Visa notification form.

I've been trying to accomplish that for the past week and a half, without seeming to get anywhere.  The clerk called me this morning, and in my passport he noticed that the visa I had from my trip to China for a converence was valid until April of this year, and was a multiple-entry visa.  So now I don't have to worry about getting a new visa, but can simply use the old but unexpired one.  Wewww.  One less thing to worry about.

(1) the vice of envy, particular as it relates both to jealousy and prudence/practical wisdom

(2) divine freedom (there's a big literature on this--I'm mainly interesting in comparisons between human and divine freedom)

(3) the development of the capacities involved in free will--this could either be discussions of what those capacities required are (e.g., Wallace's "reflective self-control") or discussions of these capacities from developmental psychology.

Thanks.

• phil of mind was, by pretty sizable margin, the highest reported AOS.  In fact, of the 3226 people who completed the survey, 721 reported phil of mind as their first AOS and 385 reported it as their secondary AOS.  Assuming that people did not double report their AOS's (I can't remember if you could do this when filling out the survey; even if you could, I'd think not may people would), greater than 1/3 of respondants work in phil of mind.  This struck me as very odd.
• of the people who took the survey and filled out gender (I'm assuming by 'gender' they meant 'biological sex'), only 488 (of the 3013) are female.  This is surprising to me given that the vast majority of respondants are born in the 70s or 80s (and thus are either grad students are new PhD's).  I would have thought that this proportion would be higher, not among the profession, but among this sub-population.
• more people identify more with Davidson than with Plato (and more with Carnap than with Aquinas and Augustine combined!)
• of all respondants, 2/3 accept or lean toward atheism while only 18.5% accept or lean toward theism.  Among people who identify phil of religion as an AOS, the percentage of those accepting or leaning toward theism is 68.3%.  (For a discussion of this issue, see here and here.)
• (metaphysical, not political) libertarianism is a very minority view in general (18.3%, not too surprising) but also among philosophers of action (22.4%).  Libertarianism is much more widespread among philosophers of religion (49.1%).
• free will skepticism is higher among philosophy undergrads than among either the general population or among PhD's.

Spring Break, 15 - 19 March (my trip to China will be this week, and either the week before or the week after)

Pacific APA, 31 March - 4 April

Wisdom Conference, 15 - 17 April

 

I have at least one other trip this spring, but it's not scheduled yet.

According to what two friends and colleagues write in a professional journal, I'm a kleptomaniac and it's almost my birthday.  Oh, and I have friends.  Surprising, huh?

the Existence Question--do humans have free will?

My aim is this chapter isn't to provide an answer, but to provide a framework for understanding how one's answer to the question depends on other issues involving free will.  (These two posts at the GFP were part of my process of thinking about these issues.)

If you're interested in taking an early look at it and giving me some feedback, let me know.  I need to make revisions by 1 December.