Is every case of akratic action also a case of sloth (understood properly as acedia, not mere laziness)?
Vices Question...
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I don't think so. If akrasia just involves acting contrary to one's judgment about what is best for one to do, it seems one can do this without being slothful or apathetic in the relevant sense. Consider someone who acts in a weak-willed manner in Holton's sense---i.e. violates a resolution by succumbing to temptation---but also acts contrary to her better judgment. Suppose, as is usual in succumbing to temptation, she tries very hard and struggles to fight the urges. She is then akratic without being apathetic or slothful. She really cares about fighting the temptation. She just lacks sufficient will-power.
However, it does seem that all cases of akrasia that aren't weakness of will (in Holton's sense) are cases of acedia. After all, in those cases the person, by hypothesis, isn't fighting to resist temptation since she hasn't formed the resolution to stay the course. I've never really thought about that. Interesting!
Josh,
Thanks, that's helpful. While I'm not too familiar with Holton's account of weakness of will, what you say here makes sense and gives me more to think about.